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Abstract—Cooperative driving and platooning have gained
a growing focus recently. Letting vehicles to reach a consensus
and make a joint decision is necessary for some applications.
To address this problem, we propose a novel consensus protocol
named BFT-ARM that fits real sensor values and can tolerate
t(< n/3) Byzantine nodes out of n. BFT-ARM guarantees that
the decision is close to the median of all good nodes. We also
present the simulation framework ArteryLTE to evaluate our
protocol.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, an increasing amount of Advanced Driver
Assistance Systems (ADASs) can be seen in automobiles.
This also includes the development of cooperative driving
functions. Many of these applications can be improved by
exchanging data via Inter-Vehicle Communication (IVC)
to improve safety, resource usage, energy efficiency and
driving experience [1]. One example of cooperative driving
is platooning, where a group of vehicles can follow each
other automatically and keep the optimal distance among
each other [2, 3]. Apart from following passively, there are
also a number of useful applications which first need to
agree on a common value for a cooperative decision. For
example, in certain application scenarios vehicles will need
to detect the traffic condition or weather condition in their
surroundings to adjust their operations to, or to calculate the
best route according each vehicle’s own navigation device,
or to set a preferred speed for the cruise control, etc. The
common properties of such applications are: 1) The value is
required to be agreed among all vehicles. 2) The value to be
agreed upon can be measured individually by each vehicle.
3) Even if some faulty vehicles do not follow the common
decision, the safety of others is not violated.
We also consider the existence of faulty or malicious
nodes in the group. Faulty behaviours include not only
crash faults but also arbitrary faults like bit flip or providing
inaccurate, inconsistent and even malicious values. All these
faults are referred to as Byzantine faults [4]. The Byzantine
1This work is part of the DFG Research Unit Controlling Concurrent
Change, funding number FOR 1800.
consensus protocol is aiming at achieving consensus among
all correct participants, despite of a limited number of faulty
nodes. Examples of such protocols can be found in [5, 6].
Most Byzantine consensus problems assume the value
domain is discrete and limited, for instance the binary
consensus [5] or multi-value consensus [7]. However, in
automobile applications, especially those involving sensor
values, the values can be continuous and “smooth” e. g.
speed, distance, temperature, etc.
In this work, we designed a new consensus protocol for
the continuous value domain in vehicle platooning named
BFT-ARM (Byzantine Fault Tolerant and Asynchronous
Real-value consensus with Median validity). We also built a
simulation framework based on our previous work, and will
use it to evaluate the consensus protocol.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
some related work. Section III defines the system model and
problem. Section IV presents the design of BFT-ARM and
section V introduces the evaluation framework. Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In the Byzantine consensus problem, each node has an
input value and try to make a consensus on one of them,
and there are a limited number of Byzantine nodes [5].
An important aspect of Byzantine consensus problem is
how to define the validity of the agreed value. There are
different opinions from different viewpoints. E.g., Neiger
distinguishes the Validity and Strong Validity [8]. The former
requires that if all correct nodes have the same input value,
they will decide on that value, but does not guarantee
anything when the input values are different. And Strong
Validity requires that the decided value comes from a correct
node. Then Neiger proves that achieving Strong Validity
requires at least t · |D| nodes, where t is the maximum
tolerable Byzantine nodes and D is the domain of the
input values. This means a tremendous number of nodes
are necessary when the input value domain is large.
A recent work of Stolz and Wattenhofer proposes a
weaker requirement compared to the strong validity, called
median validity [9]. It only requires the agreed value is close
to the median of all good nodes. This is especially useful
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with a continuous value domain. However, their protocol as-
sumes a synchronous communication where message trans-
mission time has a known upper bound. This assumption
is not applicable in IVC scenario. So we designed the new
BFT-ARM protocol to achieve the median validity.
There are also some other work from the viewpoint
of control theory to manage platooning via consensus ap-
proach [10]. This is useful for another family of applica-
tions like instant speed and distance control, which is an
orthogonal direction to our work.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
System Model: The platooning consists of n vehicles,
or nodes as abstraction: {p1, p2, . . . , pn}. Every node has an
input value xi 2 R 2, e.g. from its sensor or configuration.
A node is called correct if 1) its input value is correct and
2) it exactly follows the protocol. Among all the nodes up
to t (< n/3) nodes can be faulty, meaning that they can
behave arbitrarily such as take an incorrect value from a
malfunctioning sensor or not follow the protocol.
Consensus problem: BFT-ARM achieves consensus on
a value v 2 R satisfying the following conditions:
• Agreement: No two correct nodes decide differently.
• Termination: Every correct node eventually decide.
• Validity: The decided value of correct nodes v is valid
(see definition below).
Inspired by the work of [9], the validity is defined in
the following way. Assuming there are actually f (6 t)
faulty nodes during runtime (not known by the consensus
algorithm). Let SG be the sorted array of input values of all
good nodes (the index starts from 0). Then SG[dnf2 e 1]
represents the median value of SG.
Definition 1. Validity: a decision v is valid, if
SG[dn f
2
e 1 t] 6 v 6 SG[dn f
2
e 1 + t] (1)
In other words, a valid value is the one within the range
of the middle (2t+ 1) correct nodes.
Network: Nodes communicate via messages. The net-
work is asynchronous. That means messages can experience
an unbounded delay, get lost, duplicated or corrupted. How-
ever an eventually synchronous connection is required to
overcome the FLP impossibility [11]. BFT-ARM does not
rely on the synchrony to achieve agreement. So termination
needs an eventually synchronous connection.
Digital Signature and Trusted Subsystem: The mes-
sages are signed with digital signatures. A message m
signed by a node i is notated as hmi
i
. We also assume
that every node possesses a trusted subsystem for message
authentication and verification with a monotonic counter.
The value of the counter can be used to authenticate some
2In practice, the value space is still a finite set limited by the platform.
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Figure 1. BFT-ARM in normal case.
special messages, and increases by 1 after that. The partner
who receives one of these messages can also verify that this
message has the valid counter value without any gaps to
the previous ones. Examples of such subsystem applied in
Byzantine fault tolerant systems can be found in [12, 13]. We
assume that faulty nodes cannot break the digital signature
mechanism nor the trusted subsystem.
IV. BFT-ARM DESIGN
A. Normal case operation
The normal case protocol is illustrated in Figure 1.
It can be divided into 6 steps:
1) The leader pi periodically activates a consensus request
with a broadcast hSTART, seq, pii i . seq is a sequence
number generated by the trusted counter.
2) Upon received START message, each node pj firstly
verifies the sequence number. If it is a valid sequence
number, it broadcasts (including to itself) with its input
value in hINIT, seq, pj , xji j .
3) Upon the leader received (n t) values (including
itself), it sorts the received values and picks the median
value vmed. Then it proposes vmed together with the
(n t) original signed INIT messages attached as a cer-
tificate ~cm. Namely: hPROPOSE, seq, pi, vmed, ~cmi i .
4) Upon a node pj received the PROPOSE message, it
verifies that vmed is really the median of all the values
in ~cm. If so, it broadcasts hSUPPORT, seq, pj , vmedi j .
5) Upon a node pj received d(n + t + 1)/2e
SUPPORT for the same vmed, it broadcasts
hDECIDE, seq, pj , vmedi j .
6) Upon a node pj received d(n+ t+ 1)/2e DECIDE for
the same vmed, it decides vmed.
From step 3 on, BFT-ARM is similar to the PBFT
protocol [6]. So if the leader proposes the correct vmed
matching the certificate, all correct nodes will decide vmed.
Now we prove vmed is valid according to Definition 1.
Theorem 1. Let SA be the sorted array of the input values
of any (n t) nodes. The median of SA is denoted as v =
SA[dn t2 e 1]. Then v is valid.
Proof. According to the definition of median, there are at
least (dn t2 e 1) nodes whose value is no greater than v.
Among them there are at least (dn t2 e 1 f) good nodes.
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And because f 6 t < n/3, we have dnt2 e 1 f >
dn f2 e 1 t > 0. So v > SG[d
n t
2 e 1 f ] > SG[d
n f
2 e
1 t]. Similarly, we can prove that v 6 SG[dn f2 e 1+ t].
Because of the Definition 1, v is valid.
Thus the validity of the proposal can be confirmed by
comparing with the certificate of (n t) values in step 4.
We use the trusted counter to generate a sequence number
for every START message from the leader. The sequence
number is monotonically increasing by one every time, so
there is exactly one sequence number assigned to every
consensus period. In this way, faulty nodes cannot provide
an outdated value (replay attack). If a node detects that
the sequence number does not belong to this period, it
will discard the message. A synchronized clock is not
required here, but the interval of the period is known to
everyone. From the first time a node receives the sequence
number from the leader, it can determine the correspondence
between the sequence number and period.
B. Suspect leader protocol
When the leader is faulty or disconnected from the group,
leading to a fail of consensus within a predefined timeout,
the other nodes will initiate a suspect leader protocol,
basically similar to the PBFT view change protocol (without
considering about the history). When a node pj suspects
the leader pcur, it broadcasts a hSUSPECT, pj , pcur, pnewi j ,
where pnew is the next leader according to a deterministic
rule, e.g., based on the position information of the platoon
to choose the one behind the current leader until the end
and then change the direction forwards.
When pnew receives (d(n + t + 1)/2e 1) messages
suspecting current leader, it takes over the leader role and
broadcasts hNEWLEADER, pnew, seqnewi new with its own
sequence number, and operates as in the normal case.
V. EVALUATION
To evaluate BFT-ARM in platooning environments, we
intend to use an extended version of the ArteryLTE3 simu-
lation framework, which is detailed in [14].
A. Simulation Framework
ArteryLTE is based on the renowned open-source Vehi-
cles in Network Simulation (Veins) framework [15]. The
Veins project4 combines the dedicated network simulator
OMNeT++ with the microscopic traffic simulator Simulation
of Urban Mobility (SUMO). In addition, Veins also provides
an implementation of the US Wireless Access in Vehicular
Environments (WAVE) Dedicated Short Range Communica-
tion (DSRC) stack based on IEEE 802.11p.
ArteryLTE integrates several extensions to Veins:
3https://github.com/ibr-cm/artery-lte
4http://veins.car2x.org/
Figure 2. Architecture of the ArteryLTE simulation framework.
First, a modular middleware for Veins called Artery5 [16]
is used to implement heterogeneous vehicle capabilities.
Multiple applications (so-called Artery services) can be
implemented and dynamically configured for vehicles per
market penetration rates. Furthermore via Vanetza6, the
European equivalent to the WAVE stack, the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) Intelligent
Transport System (ITS) G5 protocol stack, is brought in
and used to disseminate Cooperative Awareness (CA) mes-
sages [17].
Second, ArteryLTE integrates Long Term Evolution
(LTE) support for vehicles as introduced to Veins by the
VeinsLTE [18] project, thus enabling heterogeneous com-
munication technologies on the network nodes. VeinsLTE’s
decision maker is replaced by an option in Artery’s middle-
ware that allows Artery services to choose between either
the ITS G5 or the LTE stack for communication.
Third, ArteryLTE includes support for backend-based ap-
plications. A backend is represented by a static network node
in the network which is connected to the eNodeBs of the
LTE network.
The overall architecture of the ArteryLTE simulation
framework is depicted in Figure 2. In the presented cell of
the eNodeB two vehicles are shown, both equipped with
an LTE and an ITS G5 stack. Different Artery services
(A,B and C) are deployed on the vehicles respectively. Data
transmitted via LTE by the vehicles is forwarded using a
Transfer Control Protocol (TCP) connection between the
eNodeB and the backend.
Furthermore, local perception sensors for advanced
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B. Extension of the Framework
We are bringing yet another extension into the ArteryLTE
framework: The Plexe extension [19] to Veins enables the
simulation of vehicle platoons with corresponding control
algorithms, such as for cruise control, and the implemen-
tation of cooperative driving applications. We are in the
process of porting the changes made by Plexe to Veins to
ArteryLTE’s codebase so that ArteryLTE is able to interact
with Plexe’s SUMO version via the Traffic Command Inter-
face (TraCI) protocol. We will use the platooning examples
and the included control algorithms of Plexe as the basic
scenario for our application. Vehicles of the platoon will—
in a first step—be equipped with IEEE 802.11p for local
communication to run the presented consensus protocol.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
As soon as the basic setup of BFT-ARM is implemented,
in a first step we evaluate the characteristics of the consensus
protocol among vehicles via IVC. We then intend to use
the whole potential of our communication environment to
improve the consensus process as well as to introduce further
features. For example, to take advantage of the available
heterogeneous networks, we envisage the ability to fall back
to cellular communication in cases where local communica-
tion of a group is disrupted. Furthermore, in the case of
ADASs that are tightly coupled to an Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) backend, running an agreement might
be assisted by this backend as, e. g., the backend may initiate
a consensus, or a leader change based on data available to the
backend such as network metrics or local traffic data [14].
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